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Abstract 
The United States’ pivot toward Asia has fuelled a new round of debates about 
the role of key Asian actors such as the People’s Republic of China (China) 
and traditional actors such as the European Union (EU) in global security. 
Using role theory, this paper examines EU-China security cooperation. The 
paper presents two case studies: Sino-EU maritime security cooperation in 
the Gulf of Aden and Sino-EU peacekeeping cooperation in Mali. These 
case studies examine the EU’s and China’s roles as security actors and 
as normative actors within non-traditional security challenges. The paper 
illustrates the kind of role the EU could play in the world in terms of security 
issues, as well as the norms and values that global security responses could 
create. The paper also gives a greater insight into the role a rising China could 
play in global security governance.
Keywords: Normative actor, role theory, Sino-EU relations, UN peacekeeping
1. Introduction
It has been more than a decade since David Shambaugh (2004) suggested that 
China and Europe were forming an emerging axis in international relations. 
As Sino-European economic interdependencies are constantly increasing, 
the emergence of a Sino-European axis in terms of economic cooperation 
has occurred (European Commission, 2013). The People’s Republic of 
China (China) and the European Union (EU) cooperate in global economic 
governance bodies. However, Shambaugh’s claim of an emerging axis in the 
field of global security governance seems highly unlikely and is presented 
as rhetoric (Biedermann, 2009). The presence of an EU arms embargo on 
China, conceptual gaps in human rights and sovereignty, and increasing levels 
of competition for natural resources are all barriers to the development of 
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this axis (Pan, 2012). However, China’s role in global security has changed 
dramatically, though incrementally, over the past decade, and the nation has 
attempted to develop the role of a responsible great power (Zhu, 2010). In line 
with this new role, China has increased its multilateral engagement – most 
notably, its part in the six-party talks on North Korea (Horowitz and Min, 
2006). The EU’s role in global security governance has also evolved over 
the past decade. With the strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), the EU has become more active in international security, 
developing a common role in security issues. As both China and the EU have 
become more proactive actors in global security matters, the question of a 
possible axis between the two actors re-emerges. African security governance 
has emerged as an area of common interest between China and the EU and as 
a possible area of cooperation. 
This paper argues that China and the EU will increase their cooperation in 
global security issues, particularly in regard to Africa. The paper argues that 
both actors have a historical conception of their role as great powers within 
global security affairs, which pushes them toward cooperation. To accomplish 
this paper’s goals, evidence regarding China’s and the EU’s identities and 
behaviours in global security is examined qualitatively. Two case studies of 
Sino-EU security cooperation in Africa – the Gulf of Aden and Mali – will 
be examined to demonstrate that their role conceptions result in a repeated 
pattern of role behaviour. 
2. Role Theory Framework 
Role theory is a theoretical framework that is committed to the study of 
behaviour using the notion of “role”. This study falls within the constructivist 
international relations (IR) framework of role theory (Harnisch, 2001; 
Maull, 1990). This paper employs process-tracing techniques outlined by 
Krotz and Sperling (2011) and Gottwald and Duggan (2011) to track core 
elements of role expectations. Taking a single role assumption, this paper will 
understand a role expectation to be a balance of the domestic expectations 
(ego expectations) and the implicit or explicit demands of others (alter 
expectations). In terms of alter expectations, it is important to note that not 
all “others” carry the same weight (Shih, 2013). This is clearly outlined by 
Wendt, who stated that “not all others are equally significant … so power 
and dependency relations play important roles in the story” (1999: 327). 
There are tangible and intangible reasons for the selection of significant 
others: the tangible reasons are an actor’s resources, while the intangible 
reasons are notions of the state’s identity and the “needs” that derive from 
that identity (Wendt, 1999: 328). Therefore, the selection or appearance of 
significant others in international relations does not happen randomly. The 
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choice or constitution of a significant other is based on past experiences 
by the role beholder (Harnisch, 2011: 12). Foreign policy makers create 
domestic expectations from the perception of the outlook of internal actors 
such as economic elites or other key state supporters among the general 
population. The influence of public opinion on foreign policy issues (Cantir 
and Kaarbo, 2012), as well as a state’s historical self (Harnisch, 2015), is 
key to determining domestic expectations. The current self stabilizes both 
relevant to a current significant other and to its historical self (McCourt, 
2012). Both the historical self and the current self are conceptual through 
“ontological security” (Zarakol, 2010), which can be defined as the situation 
in which “an actor has a consistent sense of ‘self’ by performing actions in 
order to underwrite his/her notion of ‘who they are’” (ibid: 3). A state seeks 
ontological security because it wants to maintain a consistent self-identity. 
That “self” is constituted and maintained through a historical narrative that 
gives life to routinized foreign policy actions (Steele, 2008: 2-3). Maintaining 
those foreign policy action routines, which maintain a state’s historical 
narrative, allows the state to protect its historical self. Mitzen (2006) argues 
that a state values those routines as they underwrite the state’s sense of self 
and that a state might privilege routine over other values, even when physical 
cost is involved. Therefore, roles are created by the combination of an actor’s 
subjective understandings of what its behaviour should be – that is, its role 
conceptions – and international and domestic society’s demands – that is, its 
role expectations – combined with the particular context in which the role is 
being acted out (Elgström and Smith, 2006: 5, Holsti, 1970: 239). Roles are 
neither deterministic nor infinitely elastic (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot, 
1996: 733). They are the categories of behaviour that states, like individuals, 
rely on to simplify and to help guide them through a complex world. Roles 
provide individual states with a stable sense of identity (Bloom, 1991). As 
an approach to the study of international relations, role theory offers a thick 
description and does not codify abstract regularities (Walker, 1987: 255), 
and the inclusion of role perception in this paper is the acceptance that roles 
are institutionalized in social structures (Wendt, 1999: 227). Thus, this paper 
adopts a particular epistemological and ontological position. Carlsnæs (2002: 
241) outlines the epistemological position of role theory as an interpretative 
perspective – that is, that role theory produces interpretative knowledge 
that offers a thick description rather than causal explanations (Walker, 
1987). For Carlsnæs (2002: 241), the ontological positions of role theory 
focus on “the reasoning of individual national foreign policy makers”. In 
foreign policy analysis, role theory exemplifies the bottom-up individualist 
interpretative approach, which is concerned with understanding “decisions 
from the standpoint of the decision makers by reconstructing their reasons” 
(Hollis and Smith, 1990: 74). However, this position does not deal with the 
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intersubjective ideas that come into consideration with the involvement of 
role perceptions. Therefore, by including role perception, this paper takes a 
holistic approach.
3. The EU’s Role
The EU’s role in global security governance is mixed. Seeking to play a more 
active role in global affairs, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
In many foreign policy security issues – particularly softer security issues 
– the twenty-eight EU member states have a powerful collective influence. 
On the other hand, some critics – including significant others, such as the 
United States, Russia and China – assert that, on the whole, the EU remains 
an economic power only and that its foreign and security policies have little 
global impact (Dai and Zhang, 2007). Past institutional arrangements that 
developed to give the EU a security function have often failed to coordinate 
the EU’s full range of resources, most notably the conflict after the breakup 
of Yugoslavia. The inherent difficulties of reaching a complete consensus 
among the member states and the conflicting global security role key members 
such as France and the United Kingdom play set limits on the EU’s external 
policies (Koenig, 2014). 
The EU has conducted thirty operations under its CSDP (EEAS, 2014). 
To develop a stronger CSDP that would have a greater impact in global 
security issues, EU member states have been attempting to increase their 
military capabilities and promote greater defence integration. Outside non-
traditional security issues and civilian missions, these efforts have met with 
limited success thus far. Civilian missions and capabilities, however, are 
also central components of the CSDP (Tonra, 2003). The majority of CSDP 
missions have been civilian operations in areas such as police training and 
rule of law. The EU has been far more active in soft areas of global security 
(Lasheras, Pohlmann, Katsioulis and Liberti, 2009). It has been a strong actor 
in areas such as trade, humanitarian aid, development assistance, and food 
and energy security using soft tools such as enlargement and neighbourhood 
policy to encourage peace within the region (Orbie, 2009). This fits with the 
typology of the EU as a “civilian power” during the Cold War (Duchêne, 
1972), as a “normative actor” in the 1990s (Tocci, 2008) or, since 2000, as 
a “Minervian Actor” (Manners, 2013). All these typologies have a common 
underlying role: as outlined by Karen Smith (2003: 111), “the EU still clearly 
prefers positive civilian to coercive military measures. The emphasis is on 
the panoply of civilian instruments that the EU … has at its disposal, and 
that puts it in the unique position of being able both to contribute to prevent 
conflict from erupting and to manage the aftermath of conflict” (Sjursen, 
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2006: 237). It seems clear that in global security governance, the EU’s role 
is as a normative civilian power focusing on conflict prevention through its 
use of economic power within the system to prevent conflict from occurring 
or to reconstruct governance institutions after conflicts have been resolved. 
However, the EU’s historical self has an effect on this role in global security 
given the particular context of a security event. A number of EU powers 
have a long history of playing a major power role in global security – most 
notably France and the UK. These historical roles as great powers still have 
an influence on the historical self and, therefore, of the construction of the 
current role of the former great powers. Within the national role conception 
(NRC) of actors such as France and the UK, the role of a great power is still 
present in their role construction. Both the UK and France have played a 
strong role in global security over the past few decades. It is clear that they 
also plan to continue this role. In the UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy, 
for example, it is clear that the UK still sees itself as having a major role in 
international security: 
This strategy for maintaining British security and influence in the world is 
characterised by the new National Security Council. We will tie in the efforts 
of all government departments to address threats to our security and interests 
and to seek new opportunities for Britain. The National Security Council has 
reached a clear conclusion that Britain’s national interest requires us to reject 
any notion of the shrinkage of our influence. (H.M. Government, 2010)
The historical self of France and the UK as great powers has a strong 
influence on the EU’s role in global security. The UK promotes its role as a 
great power within the framework of NATO, while France attempts to develop 
an independent EU role in security matters under the Petersberg tasks. Le livre 
blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale (Défense et Sécurité nationale, 
2013: 64) highlights this clearly: 
France shares with its European partners most threats and the risks it is 
confronted with: The most pragmatic approach to this problem is that 
we are more effective if we are able to face the problem together. That 
is why, as part of its national defence and security, France considers the 
development of a common European defence and security a priority. This 
is driven by the belief that a European response would be greater than the 
sum of national responses.
These contradictory paths to playing out their roles of great powers within 
a European framework prevent the EU from playing a role in harder security 
issues. Instead, the EU often plays a supporting role to NATO. Nicole Koenig 
(2014) highlighted this conflict of roles during the 2011 Libyan crisis, where 
different views of the EU’s role in the crisis led to an inability of the EU to 
go beyond that of a civilian power, leaving the hard security role to NATO. 
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4. China’s Role
China’s rise and the 2008 global financial crisis have fuelled a new round of 
debates concerning the sustainability of the norms and institutions that have 
dominated global governance, including global security governance. China 
is often seen as a threat to global security. Significant others – including the 
United States, Japan and the ASEAN nations – have seen China’s role as 
that of an aggressive actor. The key concept to this altercasting has been the 
China threat theory, which states that China, as a rising power, will come into 
conflict with the United States, the current hegemonic power. This conflict 
will result in the US and its allies attempting to prevent China’s rise within 
international relations. China’s peaceful rise was a direct response to the 
China threat theory, which developed from the realist understanding of the 
balance of power theory. China’s peaceful rise was an attempt to display a 
different view of China’s future role within international relations and to 
present China as a responsible great power that works to maintain a stable 
global system. China can be said to be playing the roles both of an aggressive 
actor/revisionist state and of a responsible actor/status quo state, conforming 
to both China’s threat theory and China’s peaceful development theory. 
China’s aggressive policy in the South and East China Seas over disputed 
territories, as well as assertive behaviour in the Indian Ocean (Bersick and 
Duggan, 2013), is the role behaviour of an aggressive actor. However, China’s 
increased involvement in areas such as UN peacekeeping, antiterrorism and 
non-traditional security fulfil its responsible actor role. The fact that China 
plays both roles can be explained by the development of its historical self and 
by domestic expectations of China’s role in the world. 
China’s historical self has both a modern and an ancient influence. 
Historically, China held a position at the centre of a regional power structure 
referred to in the West as the “Tributary System”. Song Nianshen highlighted 
that the system was far more than an interstate system; it was a multilateral 
and multi-layered system of international relations. According to Song, the 
state-to-state relationships within the Tributary System were “woven into 
a complex, multilevel power nexus composed of interconnections among 
multiple political, economic, ideological, and science and technological cores 
and peripheries” (Song, 2012: 167). This conception of China’s position at the 
centre of a complex, multilevel power nexus has a profound effect on China’s 
ontological understanding of its role within international relations and on 
states’ management of their interactions. It means that within the development 
of China’s contemporary role, the historical self conceptualizes China as 
a central power or “civilization-state” (Pye, 1990), pushing China toward 
creating a role that has a great power or central power foundation (Connolly 
and Gottwald, 2013). This can be seen in a number of contemporary foreign 
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policy documents, such as China’s Peaceful Development, China-Japan-
ROK Cooperation (1999-2012), China’s Foreign Aid, and Diaoyu Dao: An 
Inherent Territory of China (State Council, 2011b; 2012a; 2011a; 2012b), 
which highlight China’s position as a historical major power. This historical 
self also links previous reincarnations of China with the contemporary state in 
terms of the territories that are understood to comprise China, and it creates a 
very strict understanding of the limits of those territories (Schneider, 2014). 
The modern influence on China’s historical self is from China’s period of 
semi-colonisation by Western powers (1839-1949), known as the “century 
of humiliation”. This contributed to the fall of the Qing Empire and the rise 
to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After the foundation of 
the People’s Republic of China, the country played two roles in international 
relations: a new type of socialist great power and a developing great power 
(Men, 2013a). The century of humiliation helped to create an anti-imperialist, 
prodeveloping-states role for China in the period after World War II. The 
colonial question, which concerned the peoples of Africa and Asia that 
convened in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955, accelerated the PRC’s involvement 
with the developing world. The Bandung Conference laid the ideological 
and philosophical foundation for South-South Cooperation. Following the 
Bandung Conference, China began to support wars of national liberation in 
the developing world, particularly in Africa. This can be seen as an attempt 
by the PRC to shed its historical victimhood of the semi-colonial period of 
Chinese history through the promotion of decolonization within Africa. This 
attempt continued through the 1950s, and by the early 1960s, the PRC had 
established relations with a number of left-leaning or radical states (Larkin, 
1971: 39). A focus on the needs of the developing world is contained in 
China’s contemporary role in global security governance. Chinese pressure 
within the G20 to increase the forum’s focus on developing nations’ food 
security has already created some reforms within global food security 
governance (Duggan and Naarajarvi, 2015). 
The influence of China’s historical self has created a role for China that 
can often be contradictory. While China is playing the role of a great power 
within Asia and defending its historical territory, it also plays the role of 
leader/defender of the developing world outside the Asian region, in line 
with its anti-imperialist, prodeveloping-states role. This may be, in part, 
due to the geographical context in which China has adopted its roles (Shih 
and Yin, 2013). For example, China does not cooperate in terms of security 
governance with Japan within Asia. However, it is willing to cooperate with 
other power actors. For example, it cooperates with Russia in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. Yet China is willing to cooperate with Japan 
outside the Asian region, as in the case of maritime security cooperation in 
the Gulf of Aden. 
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Chinese domestic expectations, which are also shaped by China’s 
historical self, contribute to the contradictory role China plays in global 
security. As Christensen and Li (2013) identified, several domestic phenomena 
have affected China’s international role: growing domestic divisions in the 
understanding of security in China; demonstrating nationalist, internationalist, 
realistic or liberal attitudes; and growing importance of various interests 
stemming from political, economic and social spheres of society. Christensen 
and Li (2013) thus argue that China’s self-perception of its domestic security 
situation has both a conventional aspect as well as an unconventional aspect. 
The latter is backed by a 2012 survey on the Chinese public’s security 
perceptions, which identified that the top security concerns for the majority 
of Chinese are not economic and military threats from the outside but 
internal energy shortages (Jung, 2012). China’s role as an anti-imperialist, 
prodeveloping-states actor is also present in China’s discourse on its role 
in global security governance (Zhao, 2010; Men, 2013b). As outlined by 
Noesselt (2013: 17), in creating a role conception, “the Chinese government 
is … faced with the difficult task of trying to balance domestic and global 
expectations, as well as old and new role conceptions”. In terms of the 
creation of China’s role conception in the area of global security governance, 
it is clear that China’s role can vary greatly, depending on geographical 
location, the partners involved in governance and the issue. However, China 
attempts to play some form of great power role. 
5. China-EU Security Cooperation
The EU-China Strategic Partnership, which is based on the 1985 EU-China 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, has grown to include security matters. 
The issues that the EU and China discuss during their regular meetings 
are organized into three pillars: political dialogue, economic and sectoral 
dialogue, and people-to-people dialogue. There are annual summits, regular 
high-level dialogues and more than fifty sectoral dialogues on topics including 
security cooperation. Despite the presence of security cooperation in the 
sectoral dialogues of the EU-China Strategic Partnership, it is unclear what 
each actor’s role expectation is of the other. 
As highlighted by Stumbaum (2011: 15), for decades the EU considered 
China “just too far away and too weak to matter to the Europeans in security 
aspects”, while today the EU considers China to be a key player in global 
security governance. For its part, China sees the EU as a peaceful power 
(Zhang, 2011: 24) and an important part of the development of a multipolar 
world. However, there is a clear understanding that, as a security actor, the 
EU is a secondary significant other compared with the US and Russia in 
matters of traditional security, and it is expected to support the position of 
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the US (Xu, 2009). In terms of non-traditional security matters, however, 
China sees the EU as a significant other. As outlined by Zhu (2007), in 
China, the EU’s concept of security has been seen to gradually shift from an 
emphasis on political and military security, sovereignty, and development to 
an emphasis on safety, the safety of human society, and a comprehensive and 
integrated security. In terms of China’s security concept, in order to become 
a responsible great power, China must move toward more comprehensive, 
integrated security (Breslin, 2014), and the EU is seen as a key partner in 
that movement (Wenwen, 2015). As China does not see the EU as having 
a strong military role in Asia, it is therefore not seen as a threat to China’s 
national cores interests (Zhu, 2007). China’s expectation of the EU’s role in 
global security can be clearly seen in the 2014 China’s Policy Paper on the 
EU, which focuses on non-traditional security matters like water and energy 
security rather than more traditional security issues (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014). The EU’s role expectation of China is that it becomes a 
more responsible global power (Barroso, 2012). In terms of global security 
governance, it is clear that the EU sees itself as a partner for China. Catherine 
Ashton, high representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
has outlined that the EU is willing to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with 
China in high-level dialogue, antipiracy, peacekeeping, international and 
regional security (Ministry of National Defense, 2013), and the Guidelines 
on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia also clearly sees China 
as a partner in global security, as well as regional security in Asia (Council 
of the European Union, 2012). The EU has also engaged with China in the 
Iranian nuclear proliferation issue, as well as the conflict in Libya (Godement, 
2010) and the ongoing conflict in Syria, but success has been limited. In the 
area of Sino-EU security cooperation, the EU sees China as a rising power 
that needs to be engaged and encouraged to become a responsible power, 
helping to maintain the current system of international relations. Socialising 
China within that system is part of the EU’s role as a normative power 
(Odgaard and Biscop, 2006). As both China and the EU are major investors 
and trading partners with Africa, supporting the continent’s security is a matter 
of common interest (Duggan, 2014). Both actors support the development of 
African security architecture. This is achieved in a number of ways, including 
supporting the security capacity of African regional and sub-regional bodies, 
providing support for peacekeeping missions, and helping to deal with 
many of the underlying issues that led to conflict (Van Hoeymissen, 2010; 
EEAS, 2015a; Brosig, 2014). Both actors offer Africa different models of 
peacekeeping (Sicurelli, 2010). However, as China has adopted some Western 
norms in terms of peacekeeping (Alden and Large, 2015), cooperation in 
peacekeeping in Africa is still an area of cooperation between the EU and 
China (Liu, 2011). 
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It is clear that China is attempting to perform actions in order to 
underwrite its notion of itself as a responsible great power. The EU is also 
trying to underwrite its historical self by attempting to act as a normative 
power, socialising China within the global security governance system. If 
both actors’ roles in global security governance are, in part, an attempt to 
underwrite their historical selves as great powers, this should be evident in 
their role behaviour. Africa’s security issues offer both actors an opportunity 
to fulfil these roles, as well as an opportunity for cooperation. This paper 
examines two cases of China-EU cooperation in African security architecture.
6. Gulf of Aden 
Between 2000 and 2009, pirates attacked 538 commercial shipping vessels 
and vessels carrying humanitarian aid off the coast of Somalia, mainly in the 
Gulf of Aden (UNODC, 2009: 193). Poverty, lack of economic development, 
and threats to environmental, energy and food security driven by commercial 
overfishing and by Somalia’s civil war has forced Somalia’s fishermen into 
piracy. The high level of piracy in one of the world’s most strategic shipping 
lanes has led to a number of international security responses. However, 
rather than a single response, a number of states and bodies have launched 
their own security missions in order to deal with the issue. More than a 
dozen nations have sent ships on antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. A 
number of these are participating in Combined Task Forces 150 and 151 
under the multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) (CMF, 2014). 
The Europeans launched EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta in 2008. It was 
the EU’s first naval operation under the framework of the Common Security 
and Defence Policy. Forces participating in Operation Atalanta have been 
tasked with providing protection for vessels of the World Food Program 
and the African Union’s military mission to Somalia (AMISOM), as well as 
fishing and merchant vessels in the region (EEAS, 2014). The EU forces are 
authorised to “employ the necessary means, including the use of force, to 
deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end to acts of piracy and 
armed robbery, which may be committed in the areas where they are present” 
(European Union Council Secretariat, 2009). Although this EU mission is not 
part of the CMF, it does coordinate with the CMF. A number of other nations 
– including Russia, China, India and Malaysia – have sent their own national 
naval forces to the region to protect their vessels and crews from pirates. 
These naval forces operate independently of the EU mission. China has not 
joined any coalition, and as outlined by Ma Luping, director of the Navy 
Bureau of Operations of the People’s Liberation Army, the primary goal in 
the PLA Navy mission (PLA-N) was to “provide security for Chinese vessels 
passing through the Gulf of Aden” (Xinhua, 2008). The Chinese mission 
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was depicted in the Chinese media as a sign of China’s rise as a responsible 
global power (Yang, 2008). However, after the PLA-N failed to deal with 
the hijacking of a Chinese ship, the De Xin Hai, on 19th October 2009 by 
Somali pirates, the need for security cooperation became clear (Christoffersen, 
2010: 16). Although China has not joined a coalition, the PLA-N did seek to 
cooperate with other actors in the region. Ministry of Defence spokesman 
Col. Geng Yansheng outlined that “the Chinese naval escort vessel actively 
participated in an international escort cooperation with relevant countries and 
organizations, including the exchange of intelligence information, joint escorts 
and joint exercises” (news.163, 2011). The failure of the PLA-N to protect the 
De Xin Hai made China aware of its shortcomings in internal security and of 
the advantages of cooperation. This became a catalyst for China’s attempt to 
develop an institutional response to the piracy problem in the Gulf of Aden 
and is a sign of China’s responsible power role. On 5th November 2009, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that China would host an international 
conference that would include the EU, NATO, Russia and Japan to better 
coordinate anti-piracy naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden. At that meeting, the 
Chinese proposed that China take a more active role in Shared Awareness and 
Deployment (SHADE) meetings and that, in fact, China should be allowed 
to lead or co-chair a future SHADE meeting. SHADE coordinates NATO, 
the EU and CTF-151 naval forces (Christoffersen, 2010: 18). Cooperation 
would take place on “the basis of a UN resolution” (Xinhua, 2008). The UN 
takes a comprehensive security approach to Somalian piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden, and China’s official policy on Somalian piracy closely parallels the 
UN’s position and reflects an emphasis on comprehensive security instead 
of the use of warships, therefore putting a greater focus on non-traditional 
security issues (Chu, 2004). The EU, as a civilian power, is seen by China 
as a natural partner for this cooperation, and China targets the EU for this 
aspect of the response to the piracy problem (Zhou, 2011). The EU’s role as 
a normative power comes into play as it replies to China’s attempt to create 
an institutional response and to develop further global security cooperation 
to deal with the problem of piracy. Under this role, the EU hopes that 
Chinese cooperation on antipiracy will spillover into other areas of security 
cooperation (Christoffersen, 2010: 18). It seems that this spillover effect has 
taken place. According to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical 
Weapons, a Chinese Task Force would enter the Mediterranean to join Russia 
in escorting chemical weapons out of Syria to a US ship and monitor them 
to be demolished at sea (Zhou, 2013). However, the EU’s role as a civilian 
power or a non-traditional security actor – rather than a traditional security 
actor – is cemented here, as the EU is not part of this naval mission, which 
deals with more traditional security. 
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7. Chinese Peacekeeping in Mali
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) declared 
the independence of Azawad in April 2012, and took control of much of the 
north of Mali within a short period of time. Like previous Tuareg rebellions, 
this group was bound together by ethnic and clan loyalties (Boukhars, 2013). 
However, unlike previous rebellions in the north of Mali, this revolt also had 
a hard-line jihadist element (Soares, 2005). The combination of these groups 
led to a rapid expansion of the areas under their control. The first attempt to 
deal with the conflict in Mali was a peacekeeping operation by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS developed a 
contingency plan for an intervention, which called for an ECOWAS force to 
deploy into Mali with backup from the international community. The EU’s 
response to the conflict in Mali was to provide training and financial support 
to the Malian state. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali 
had a mandate to train about 2,500 Malian soldiers to retake Northern Mali 
with the support of a mainly ECOWAS contingent, but it had a non-combat 
mission (EEAS, 2015a). However, the speed of the jihadist militant groups’ 
advance took ECOWAS by surprise. ECOWAS forces were unprepared 
and underequipped to engage the jihadist militant groups. While the United 
Nations had placed the onus on resolving the crisis on the Malian government, 
it was clear that neither the UN nor the Malian government were in a position 
to respond to the crisis (United Nations Security Council, 2012). The French 
intervention in Mali, named Opération Serval, was launched on 11th January 
2013. French and African troops quickly pushed the rebels back, recapturing 
key towns in Northern Mali before the end of the month (Ministère de la 
Dèfense, 2013). The French force remained at the forefront of the peace 
operation, launching Opération Hydre in October 2013, which carried out 
actions between Timbuktu and the northern city of Gao. In August 2014, the 
French launched Opération Barkhane, a partnership between the key countries 
of the Sahel-Saharan Strip (BSS): Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina 
Faso (Ministère de la Dèfense, 2014). The mandate of Opération Barkhane 
was to support the armed forces of the BSS partner countries in their actions 
against terrorist armed groups and to help prevent the reconstitution of 
terrorist sanctuaries in the region. While France took the lead in terms of 
military intervention, the EU took the lead in terms of peace building. On 18th 
February 2013, the EU launched a training mission for Malian armed forces, 
EUTM Mali, with twenty-two member states contributing. The mandate of 
the mission was to restore democratic order, to help the Malian authorities 
exercise their sovereignty, and to neutralize organized crime and terrorist 
threats (EEAS, 2015c). The EU adopted a comprehensive approach to the 
conflict, offering a number of non-combatant aspects to the mission, including 
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523 million euros to fund a project targeting the underlying causes of the 
conflict, such as food insecurity (EEAS, 2015b). On 15th April 2014, the EU 
also established a civilian mission under CSDP to support the internal security 
forces in Mali (EEAS, 2015d). As part of this mission, a 15 million euro fund 
to combat food insecurity in the area was created using the framework of the 
Programme d’Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire (EEAS, 2015e). The European 
involvement in Mali is a reflection of the EU’s dual role in the world. The 
military involvement of France is a reflection of the great power role played 
by the EU’s member states, while the peace building role played by the EU is 
a reflection of the EU’s civilian power role. 
A peace agreement was signed in June 2013 (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2013). Following the creation of a peace deal between the 
MNLA and the central government, in April 2013 under UN Security Council 
Resolution 2100 (2013) (United Nations Security Council, 2013), the UN 
authorized the formation of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (United Nations Security Council, 2013). The mission 
of MINUSMA was the re-establishment of Malian state authority and the 
protection of civilians and historical sites (United Nations Security Council, 
2013). The authorised strength of MINUSMA was 12,680, and by the 30th of 
June, 15,209 peacekeepers had been committed (United Nations, 2017). These 
peacekeepers come from fifty-two countries, including China and EU member 
states. Beijing dispatched troops to Mali in what Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi described as a “comprehensive security force” (Hille, 2013). China first 
dispatched a 170-member peacekeeping guard detachment to the Mali mission 
area in West Africa at the request of the United Nations to guard the UN 
headquarters in Gao (Ministry for Defence, 2014a). In total, China dispatched 
395 officers and soldiers, including 170 members in guard detachment, 155 
in engineer detachment and 70 in medical detachment (Ministry for Defence, 
2015a). The Chinese troops who were dispatched as peacekeepers had both 
a guard and support function. The troops understood that this was not just a 
peacekeeping operation but also a reflection of China’s attempt to adopt a 
responsible great power role. This is clear from a statement of Vice Captain 
Zhao Guangyu: “We have confidence … that we will fulfil our mandate in 
accordance with the relevant requirements of the UN peacekeeping operations, 
showing China’s role as a protector of international peace and a responsible 
great power” (Hu, 2014). By the end of September 2014, the guards had 
carried out 600 patrol tasks and more than two hundred escort tasks in the 
area of responsibility of the MINUSMA (Ministry for Defence, 2014b). The 
Chinese engineer detachment had successively completed multiple tasks 
(Ministry for Defence, 2015a), including 100 construction and support tasks, 
such as constructing roads, erecting bridges and building makeshift housing 
(ibid). The medical detachment had treated 1,281 people and hospitalized 84 
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patients (Ministry for Defence, 2015a). The combination of troops and their 
activities was a reflection of China’s attempt to develop a comprehensive 
security force that would allow China to contribute to peace building.
The Chinese comprehensive security approach also targeted Malian food 
and water insecurity, which had been the main driving force of the current 
and previous conflicts in Northern Mali. Under the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 2013-2017 Country Programming 
Framework, a South-South Cooperation project was set up to enhance Mali’s 
agricultural production through the provision of Chinese technical assistance 
(FAO, 2014). It is clear that in Mali, China is taking a wider approach 
to dealing with many of the non-traditional security threats that are the 
underlying causes for much of the conflict. This, combined with a contribution 
of peacekeeping troops, including combat troops, is a reflection of China’s 
attempt to adopt a comprehensive security approach to international 
peacekeeping. It is also a reflection of China’s desire to play a responsible 
great power role in international relations. 
As highlighted by Richard Gowan (2014), an associate fellow at the 
European Council on Foreign Relations, African security is one of the few 
bright spots for Sino-European cooperation, and the case of Mali is one of the 
best examples of Sino-EU cooperation in peacekeeping on the continent. Both 
China and the EU took a comprehensive security approach to the mission, 
dealing not only with the military threat but also with the underlying causes 
of the conflict, such as food insecurity. The UN mission in Mali marked the 
first occasion when China sent troops on full combat mandates. However, 
China is also playing a strong role in the mission in more traditional areas, 
such as diplomacy and development. As China added a military element 
to its peacekeeping mission, it is interesting to note that Chinese troops 
in Mali were stationed in a base alongside Dutch troops (Nederlandse 
Vertegenwoordigingen China, 2015). The Chinese have noted that the Dutch 
3D approach – which integrates diplomacy, defence and development – is 
seen as a very effective approach toward peace building. It is clear that China 
sees the EU and EU member states as partners for the development of a 
comprehensive approach to peacekeeping. It is also clear that cooperation with 
China in these missions offer the EU an opportunity to shape China’s norms 
in terms of peacekeeping. 
8. Conclusion 
Historically, both China and Europe have played major roles in determining 
global security and have helped develop the current system of global security 
governance. Europe has had a major role in global affairs, and particular 
security issues are clearly part of the EU’s self-identity. This can be seen 
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by the development of the CSDP but also by role behaviour, such as the 
formation of an EU mission in the Gulf of Aden outside the umbrella of 
NATO and the EU’s role in the UN’s mission in Mali. These are the results 
of the EU meeting its domestic expectations to play a greater role in security 
affairs. This expectation has developed from the EU’s historical self, which 
is built on Europe’s historical role as a major power in global security affairs. 
However, in terms of security governance, the EU is a normative actor. This 
is due to the internal role conflict that prevents the EU from moving beyond 
its function as a civilian power and to the fact that external powers view the 
EU’s role as acting within the realm of non-traditional security issues. Brexit 
(British exit from the EU) may in fact reinforce this role, as the EU will lose 
one of its strongest traditional security actors.
In terms of Sino-EU security cooperation, it is clear that China sees the 
EU as an important actor but considers its role as one of a non-traditional 
security actor. This is apparent from China’s role behaviour. In the Gulf 
of Aden and in Mali, China has attempted to encourage the EU to adopt a 
comprehensive approach to non-traditional security issues. However, it did 
not attempt to cooperate with the EU in traditional security issues of escorting 
chemical weapons out of Syria to a US ship and monitoring their destruction 
or the French-led military intervention in Northern Mali. This will be left to 
the US, Russia, NATO and, to a lesser extent, France, which China perceives 
as having a traditional security role.
China is attempting to play the role of a responsible great power in global 
security governance. This can be seen by its increased activity in global 
security responses. There is a domestic expectation that China should play a 
greater role in global affairs, and the positive response to the PLA-N mission 
in the Gulf of Aden and the PLA’s mission in Mali is an indication that China 
is playing this role. There is an external expectation that China should become 
a responsible great power and assume some of the burden of ensuring global 
peace and security. We can see from China’s actions in the Gulf of Aden 
and in Mali that it has engaged in and attempted to lead a global response 
to security issues. It has executed this action to benefit its own interests but 
also to protect global trade and regional stability. This is the hallmark of a 
responsible great power. We can see from the case of Sino-EU cooperation 
in the Gulf of Aden and in Mali that, in many ways, China and the EU have 
developed complementary roles. The EU is able to play a role as a normative 
actor. It achieves this by bringing China into the current system of global 
security governance. Here, China is able to fulfil its role as a responsible great 
power by engaging in and developing comprehensive security responses to 
global security issues. China can do this with the support and cooperation 
of the EU as a key actor in the non-traditional security aspects of the 
comprehensive security approach. This means that there is room for the EU 
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to play a role as a normative actor attempting to push China into a responsible 
great power role in Africa. The EU is doing this by providing institutional 
space for China to create coordinated responses to regional security issues 
with actors in the region. However, Chinese actions in the South China Sea 
in terms of the installation and expansion of military structures in disputed 
territories is clearly a fresh barrier to China fully adopting the responsible 
great power role and therefore a barrier to Sino-EU security cooperation.
Note
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